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Abstract 
Australia and New Zealand came to World War One with similar political trajectories, and 
their experience and memory of the war had much in common. However, on the key issue of 
conscription for overseas military service, they diverged. This article considers possible 
explanations for this difference. As others have noted, whereas New Zealand Prime Minister 
William Massey could be confident of a parliamentary majority, the early political power of 
the labour movement in Australia forced his Australian counterpart, W. M. Hughes, to take 
conscription to a popular vote—a forum in which the performance of politics and dissent took 
an unpredictable form. Beyond this, Hughes’s chances of gaining consent for conscription were 
compromised by the timing of the conscription campaigns in Australia—some critical months 
later than in New Zealand—his personal political style and his failure to craft a scheme of 
conscription that could secure the majority consent that the more adroit Massey achieved in 
New Zealand. 
 
 
The Australian commemoration of the centenary of World War One from 2014–18 focused 
largely on battles. In particular, prominence was given to those battles where Australians were 
the victims of poor leadership and command (such as Gallipoli and Fromelles), or in which 
they supposedly made a major contribution to Allied victory over the Central Powers (Villers-
Bretonneux and Amiens). Generally, less public attention was paid to those events on the home 
front that were arguably of greater importance in Australian political history: the two referenda 
about conscription for overseas service held in October 1916 and December 2017. These 
remarkable events not only manifested the power of participatory democracy under draconian 
wartime constraints, they also polarized Australian society along fault lines that would endure 
for decades. These referenda were also unique. No other belligerent country held a popular 
vote on an issue of such central importance to the war effort.  
 
The conscription campaigns have attracted considerable scholarly attention, initially from that 
generation of Australian historians for whom conscription gained a particular personal urgency 
during the Vietnam War.1 When a man’s fate hung on a birthday ballot, the 1916–17 debates 
about whether the state had the right to force a man to kill acquired an acute salience. The role 
of women opposing conscription also became of interest as feminist scholars entered the 
academy, in the 1980s especially.2 More recently, a new wave of scholarly interest in the 
subject has been generated by the centenary of World War One, an anniversary that Australian 
official agencies and media promoted relentlessly.3  
 
Yet despite this ongoing interest in the subject, one question still rewards further investigation: 
how it was that the opposition to conscription for overseas service triumphed in Australia? It 
is common to speak of the conscription votes of 1916 and 1917 as being “lost.” However, a 
useful reframing of the question is: how and why did the anticonscription vote win? How was 
it possible for the voices of dissent to be so powerful that Australia, alone of all countries in 
the British Empire, failed to adopt conscription? This is not a case of special pleading for 
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Australian exceptionalism—a tendency that Australian military historians are often prone to 
manifest—but rather a call to consider what we can learn from comparative history about the 
capacity of wartime dissent to be expressed in different political cultures. Comparative analyses 
of the conflict over conscription are relatively rare, and those that include Australia are rarer 
still.4 This paper therefore considers how the conscription issue unfolded in Australia and New 
Zealand: two Dominions whose political cultures and wartime experiences shared much in 
common, and yet whose histories on the question of conscription were very different. 
 
Shared Histories? 
As the acronym Anzac indicates, the Australian and New Zealander experience of World War 
One on the battlefront had much in common. The first troops from the two countries sailed 
together in the convoy leaving Albany in late 1914 and formed the Australian and New Zealand 
Army Corps soon after arriving in Egypt. These Anzacs landed within hours of each other at 
Gallipoli on 25 April 1915, and over the following months maintained a precarious hold on the 
heights above the beach. In the August offensive on Gallipoli they fought battles that would 
become iconic in their respective national memories: the Nek and Lone Pine, for Australians; 
and Chunuk Bair, for New Zealanders. With the withdrawal from Gallipoli, the Australian and 
New Zealand mounted infantries continued to serve together in the long campaign against 
Ottoman forces in Palestine. On the Western Front, the paths of the two Dominion forces 
diverged somewhat, with the Australians eventually forming their discrete Corps, but such was 
the impact of the Gallipoli battles of 1915 that that two countries came to share the 
mythologized narrative, the Anzac legend, which continues to play a major role in national 
memories today.  
 
Australia and New Zealand also came to the war with very similar political trajectories. Not 
only had they both inherited from Britain the political and legal institutions of the Westminster 
system of government; there had also been a remarkable cross-fertilization of the two political 
and industrial elites in the years before the war. In what has been described by Melanie Nolan 
as “a perennial exchange,” Australians and New Zealanders had flowed back and forth in 
successive waves across the Tasman. In 1911, three years before the outbreak of war, there 
were nearly 32,000 New Zealand-born in Australia and 50,000 Australian-born in New 
Zealand.5 The respective populations at this time were fewer than 5 million for Australia and 
1.1 million for New Zealand. Even more significant than these raw numbers was the presence 
of Australian-born men in New Zealand’s labour movement. From 1919–39 the New Zealand 
Labour Party was led by Australian-born socialists, including the militant socialist, Harry 
Holland, who edited the labour newspaper the Māoriland Worker from 1913 to 1918. Notably, 
when the New Zealand Labour Party formed its first national government in 1935, the Cabinet 
included five Australian-born men.6 
 
Yet we should not assume from these trans-Tasman links that Australia and New Zealand had 
“one history but two historiographies,” as has sometimes been argued.7 New Zealand chose not 
to join the Australian federation in 1901, a decision that has been tagged as a movement by 
New Zealand “away from the informal Tasman world,” and the manifestation of an evolving 
sense of a New Zealand identity in which Australia served as a benign “other.”8 Meanwhile, 
the strong push for trans-Tasman fraternalism in the trade union movement faded in 1913 when 
the Australian unions, under the influence of Billy Hughes, failed to come out in support of the 
Waihi miners’ strike.9 Moreover, although the Australian and New Zealand governments 
responded to the outbreak of war in August 1914 in very similar ways, embracing imperial 
loyalty and rapidly raising volunteer expeditionary forces, the manner in which the issue of 
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conscription played out in the next two years confirms that New Zealand and Australia were, 
to quote Marilyn Lake, two countries with two histories.10 Indeed, as Steven Loveridge has 
observed, “the Great War advanced multiple trans-Tasman identities. . . . Language and 
imagery that evoke[d] association, perhaps even a shared identity, developed alongside 
language and imagery tagged to a distinct conception of self, even staunch dissociation.”11  
 
How do we explain the divergence of the two countries on the critical issue of conscription? 
Given the multiplicity of variables at play, it is difficult to give a definitive answer, but three 
issues seem to have been key. The first—a variable that has long been acknowledged as 
important—was the respective power of the labour movement in the two countries, and the 
way in which this dictated the forums in which conscription was debated and the associated 
politics of performance. The other two explanations speak more to contingency and agency: 
one is the timing of the conscription debates, especially in 1916; and the second, the leadership 
styles and skills of the two Prime Ministers, Hughes and William Massey. 
 
The Power of Labour 
In 1914, Australia and New Zealand were two of the most highly unionised countries in the 
world. The number of registered unions in New Zealand had risen from 109 with a total 
membership of 27,640 in 1904, to 322 unions with a total membership of 60,622 in 1912.12 In 
Australia, trade union membership grew from under 100,000 in 1901 to well over half a million 
at the outbreak of war.13 With the exchange of personnel across the Tasman, both labour 
movements had a similarly complex ideological texture.14 They accommodated, at one end of 
the spectrum, a mix of pragmatic socialism and English-style liberalism, which involved a 
willingness to work with the emerging regulatory institutions of arbitration and conciliation, 
and, at the other end, militant socialism, anarcho-syndicalism and an advocacy of direct action, 
as espoused particularly by the Industrial Workers of the World.15 Given this complexity, 
support for arbitration was uneven and conditional, and many unionists continued to place faith 
in direct action even though this had had a mixed record of success and bitter defeat in the 
immediate prewar years, notably during the 1909 strike at Broken Hill, and at Blackball in 
1908 and Waihi in 1913.  
 
Yet, if there were similarities, there were also important differences between the two labour 
movements. One was that of scale. The New Zealand movement was smaller and thus lacked 
the resources and critical mass of its Australian counterpart. More importantly, labour in New 
Zealand had been slower to make the transition to being a political force with strong 
organisational structures across the country. Certainly, there were parliamentarians in 
Wellington endorsed by the trade unions from the early 1890s on, but in a political system 
noted for its “intimacy,” the emergence of labour was blunted by the pragmatic alliance of 
labourites with Liberals, most notably, under “King Dick” Seddon (Prime Minister 1893–
1906).16 Although Seddon’s record as a workers’ champion has been debated, his recent 
biographer has concluded that “pragmatism and genuine concern for working people’s welfare 
. . . characterised his long career [and] he achieved far more for working men and women than 
pro-Labour historians have conceded.”17 
 
In Australia, by contrast, a more fluid political landscape provided the conditions in which 
political labour movements emerged in the aftermath of the bitter defeat in the 1890 strike and 
the accompanying economic depression. As early as 1891, Labor candidates in the New South 
Wales (NSW) election had won 35 of 141 seats and held the balance of power. In 1899 Labor 
formed a minority government in Queensland, the first in the world. The development of 
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political labour in other states was less developed, but the elements of a political party structure 
were emerging across Australia. Federation in 1901 provided the occasion—indeed, the 
necessity—for Australian labour to create a national organisation. This, too, enjoyed early 
electoral success. In 1904 the Australian Labor Party (ALP) formed a minority Commonwealth 
government, the first Labor-led national government in the world. By 1910, it held sufficient 
seats in the federal lower house to form a majority government. Then, in the double dissolution 
election of September 1914, held one month after the war began in Europe, the ALP won 42 
of 75 seats in the Representatives and 31 of 36 seats in the Senate.  
 
In contrast, New Zealand labour’s attempts from about 1906 on to create a unified political 
movement floundered. Despite growing anxiety about the loss of ground by the Liberals to the 
farmers’ Reform Party, which came to power in 1912, and disillusionment with the arbitration 
system and declining wages, New Zealand labour remained a mélange of competing regional 
power bases, rival workers’ federations and small political parties. Despite two efforts in 1912 
and 1913, unity “remained imperfect” with disagreements over issues such as defence policy 
and military training.18 Only in July 1916 did the New Zealand Labour Party finally come into 
existence, when conscription helped provide a basis of unity.19 Even then, various groups, such 
as the Social Democrats in Christchurch, refused to join the new party and ideological and 
factional tensions continued.20 
 
Australian labour, too, had its own—and, as it proved, disastrous—internal tensions, but it 
began the war as “by far the strongest labour-based party in the world.”21 However, as Robin 
Archer has argued, this political strength had two, contradictory, effects. On the one hand, the 
precocious political strength of the ALP more or less silenced dissent from the labour 
movement at the outbreak of war. In contrast to the labour leaders in the United Kingdom and 
Europe, who anguished over whether to support their governments, the Labor Opposition 
leader Andrew Fisher coined the famous phrase at the height of the July 1914 diplomatic crisis 
that Australia would support Britain “to the last man and last shilling.” He was in the middle 
of a federal election campaign and, it seems, was keen to deny his conservative opponents any 
chance to cast doubt on Labor’s patriotism and imperial loyalty and its eligibility to lead the 
nation in war.22 Thus, the radical strand of labour opinion in Australia that, like its New Zealand 
counterpart, saw the “real war” as a struggle between capital and labour was marginalised at a 
critical moment of decision making. 
 
However, the very strength of political labour that marginalised dissent in 1914 proved to be 
their leader Hughes’s undoing when the issue of conscription came to be debated from late 
1915 on. Logically, the parliamentary majority enjoyed by Hughes (who became Prime 
Minister in October 1915) should have been an asset when it came to passing legislation to 
amend the Defence Act (this legislation allowed only volunteers to be deployed on overseas 
military service). But the labour movement was deeply divided on the question of conscription. 
Not only did the unions fear that military conscription would be a precursor to industrial 
conscription; as well, they were deeply distrustful of a government which had failed to curb 
the inflation in the prices of essential commodities caused by the war and which had reneged 
in late 1915 on a commitment to hold a referendum by which the Commonwealth government 
would have gained increased powers over the economy.23 Fuelling this grievance was a deeper 
division as to whether the parliamentary Labor Party owed primary loyalty to its working class 
base or to the nation as a whole, and whether the parliamentary caucus should be dictated to 
by the local party organisations.  
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The very power of Hughes’s political base then blocked the path that other governments of the 
Empire—Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom—took: that is, the introduction of 
conscription by legislation. This is not to say that the legislative path in any of these countries 
was easy. In Canada, Robert Borden introduced conscription in the face of extensive public 
resistance, especially within farming communities and French-speaking Quebec.24 In New 
Zealand, too, the passage of the Military Service Bill through parliament in May–June 1916 
triggered passionate debate and opposition both within and outside parliament. In the preceding 
months, 85 organisations, including all Trades and Labor Councils (except Otago), rejected 
conscription unless it was accompanied by conscription of wealth; and when the Bill came to 
parliament, labour parliamentarians tried to block the legislation at various divisions.25 
However, Massey had a majority that would support conscription. This was thanks to the 
coalition that his Reform Party had formed with the Liberals in August 1915 and to the 
parliamentary weakness of labour. Although all bar one of the five labour parliamentarians 
voted against the Bill on 9 June 1916, Massey had a majority of forty. There was something of 
a legislative impasse over the question of religious objectors, which meant that the Bill 
commuted between the two houses of parliament, but it finally became law on 1 August 1916. 
 
For Hughes, however, such a parliamentary path was blocked. A Bill seeking to amend the 
Defence Act would probably have been passed in the Representatives, since the Liberal 
opposition would vote for it, but in the Senate the large Labor majority would almost certainly 
have rejected it. Hughes might have tried to introduce conscription by executive action using 
the emergency powers of the War Precautions Act, but there were doubts as to the legality of 
this. Hughes had advice that a regulation under this Act could not override an express 
prohibition in the Defence Act, and in any case, both houses of parliament had the power to 
disallow a regulation under the Act.26  
 
So Hughes decided on a national plebiscite, hoping thereby to secure a mandate with which to 
outflank his own Labor Party and the powerful industrial movement. He was the only imperial 
leader who was forced to put this deeply contentious matter to a direct popular vote. Of course, 
he did this because he thought he would win. When he returned in late July 1916 from a long 
visit to the London, he received a rapturous reception, being feted as a Dominion leader who 
had tweaked the nose of the imperial government—although somewhat ominously, he was also 
pilloried by the labour press for being “duchessed” by the British establishment. Moreover, 
Hughes had prodigious powers of oratory and extraordinary energy, his poor heath 
notwithstanding, and he had a range of executive powers, including heavy censorship, with 
which he thought he could mute the critiques of conscription. 
 
The Implications of a Popular Vote 
However, there were significant risks involved in seeking popular endorsement for 
conscription. For one thing, Hughes had to fight a national campaign without his natural power 
base. Since the federal parliamentary party did not pass a formal resolution on conscription, 
many members of the caucus became reluctant to back Hughes for fear of losing their future 
preselection.27 Yes, Labor was in power in every state, bar Victoria, but the state executives of 
the party failed in the first weeks of September to respond to all of Hughes’s determined 
entreaties. Then, on 14 September, the first of a succession of ministers to resign on the issue, 
Frank Tudor, left the federal cabinet. The following day the NSW Executive of the Labor Party 
expelled Hughes and withdrew endorsement for the next state elections from the Premier of 
New South Wales, William Holman, and three other members of state parliament who 
supported conscription. All of this happened even before the Bill to conduct the referendum 
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was narrowly passed on 21 September and the six-week campaign for the vote on 28 October 
began. Holman would come out in support of conscription, but in Queensland, the Premier T. 
J. Ryan, leader of the state’s Labor government, mobilised all his state power apparatus to 
oppose Hughes—something that would have dramatic implications for the 1917 campaign, 
when Ryan and Hughes engaged in a cat-and-mouse game about the Premier’s attempts to read 
into the Hansard of the Queensland Legislative Assembly sections of a speech he had made at 
an anticonscription rally in Brisbane but which the censor had cut before publication.28 Bizarre 
though this episode seems it retrospect, it points to a key difference with New Zealand: namely, 
that under the Australian federal system there could be opposition to conscription that could 
access the resources of state power.  
 
Not only did Hughes campaign without a secure base in the ALP, but he found the formidable 
Labor press lined up against him. Most notably, he confronted the editor of The Australian 
Worker, Henry Boote, a master of words, who progressively made the organ of the Australian 
Workers’ Union (AWU) his “personal propaganda instrument.”29 Each week, Boote penned 
editorials railing against the iniquities of conscription while commissioning cartoons that 
played brilliantly on the fears of working-class Australian men—unaffordable food, loss of 
jobs to female or Asian workers, the vulnerability of married men to conscription and the 
treachery of the turncoat Hughes. Boote also brilliantly elevated the anticonscriptionist cause 
beyond class interests to the high moral ground of values and principle. As he said on 7 
September, “Society goes outside its moral jurisdiction when, against his will, it compels the 
individual to caress another; or when, against his will, it compels the individual to fight 
another.”30  
 
There were, as it happens, New Zealand counterparts to Boote and the Australian Worker, in 
the forms of Henry Holland and the Maoriland Worker. However, although Holland was 
probably a more doctrinaire socialist than Boote and had similar drive and will, he seems to 
have lacked the other’s rhetorical edge. He evidenced “the marks of a self-taught mind: the 
compilation of a massive amount of knowledge without selective rigour or analytical 
penetration.” His socialism was “at heart emotional, not intellectual,” and his uncompromising 
view that world revolution was at hand lacked some of the canny pragmatism of the Australian 
Worker.31 To add to this, the New Zealand press may have lacked the stridency that came from 
fratricidal betrayal. Massey, the farmer, was easily cast as a class enemy but Hughes was one 
of the labour movement’s most prominent leaders. His change of heart now made him a Judas, 
a rat.  
 
Of course, we cannot know how much the Australian Worker influenced the outcome of the 
conscription campaign. However, its reach was considerable. The AWU membership in 1916 
was around 100,000 and all members in NSW, Victoria, South Australia and 
Tasmania received a free copy of Australian Worker as part of their membership.32 Queensland 
and Western Australia had separate newspapers, the Worker and Westralian Worker 
respectively, but there was much sharing of content between the papers. Perhaps the Australian 
Worker did not reach all AWU members, as many were itinerant, but the paper was widely 
read by non-AWU members. Nonmembers had to pay one penny, at a time when the minimum 
wage was around £2/6/-.33 For those who did not read the Australian Worker in depth, there 
were the “extras” the paper’s Sydney office pumped out in 1916: an astonishing 5 million 
pamphlets and leaflets; half a million “How to Vote No” cards; 100,000 extra copies of the 
Australian Worker; a quarter of a million stickers; 25,000 posters; and much else. In this way, 
the paper provided a powerful counterweight to the mainstream press, all of which came out in 
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favour of conscription. It surely contributed to the mass mobilisation by which, to cite Frank 
Bongiorno, a virtual army of men and women in labour were empowered.34 It may also have 
encouraged any voters who were vacillating about whey they stood on the question of 
conscription to vote No. 
 
This points to the more general risk that the resort to a popular vote posed for Hughes: namely, 
that plebiscites often acquire an unpredictable dynamic of their own. They take debate about a 
contentious issue from the relatively controlled environment of the legislature, with its limited 
number of actors, into the public domain, with its multiple players and multiple audiences. 
Moreover, if the campaign is long—and the Australian conscription campaign of 1916 lasted 
for around two months—the debates can slip out of the control of the politicians who initiate 
them. Direct democracy, then, has a very different power dynamic to representative democracy. 
In a plebiscite, the performance of politics is given full rein in the public sphere and the politics 
of dissent take an inherently unpredictable form. 
 
So it was in 1916. Not only did the conscription campaign give voice to a plethora of issues, 
reaching well beyond the military need for compulsion, but the contending arguments were 
rehearsed on a very public stage. The restrictions imposed by the Hughes government on 
freedom of assembly and freedom of speech were substantial, but the anticonscriptionists were 
still able to hold huge public meetings across Australia, meetings that were marked by all 
manner of intimidation: heckling, booing, chanting, counting the speaker down, pelting of 
speakers with mud and rotten eggs, invading of speaker platforms, the breaking of banners, the 
singing of the Red Flag, the burning of effigies of Hughes and physical assaults. In this public 
performance of politics, dissent was given a dramatic visibility and the power relations that 
underpinned the confrontation over conscription were vividly exposed. As Jeffrey C. 
Alexander has argued: “The distribution of power in society—the nature of its political, 
economic, and status hierarchies, and the relations between its elites—profoundly affects the 
performance process.”35 So, too, does performance affect perceptions of power. The 
conscription rallies thus not only gave physical form to the confrontation between the agencies 
of the state and its opponents, fuelling perceptions of an almost authoritarian state; they also 
made visible the scale of the remarkable grassroots mobilisation. Given that voting was at the 
time voluntary, this powerful challenge to the state may have encouraged a higher participation 
rate. The turnout rates for the 1916 referendum was 82.8 percent; for 1917, 81.3 percent.36 
 
The Question of Timing 
Vacillating Australians may also have been swayed to vote by the timing of the conscription 
votes—a variable rarely acknowledged in histories of this issue. New Zealand, like the United 
Kingdom, debated and ultimately resolved the question of conscription in the first half of 1916. 
At this time there was still some possibility of extracting political capital from the Gallipoli 
campaign, which for all its failures had generated a euphoric Dominion pride, most evident in 
the commemoration of the first anniversary of Anzac Day in both countries as well as in 
London. In these early months of 1916, too, the New Zealand government, like the British 
Asquith government before it, was able to capitalise on its recent attempts to test the limits of 
voluntaryism. In 1915 a National Registration Act had obliged all New Zealand men between 
17 and 60 to register. Many had not; and when all those between 19 and 45 were asked to 
indicate whether they were prepared to enlist or undertake necessary civilian work, nearly 60 
percent said they were willing to serve overseas. A substantial minority would not volunteer 
for any kind of service.37 Massey therefore was able to mount a strong case that conscription 
was justifiable because voluntaryism had failed. 
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The Hughes government made similar efforts in the second half of 1915 to maximise voluntary 
enlistments through a War Census, which collated data on potential recruits as well as personal 
wealth, and a Call to Arms that sought to exploit patriotism, idealism and national pride to 
entice more men to volunteer. But, instead of maintaining such momentum as this generated—
and it also created some backlash, coinciding as it did with the cancellation of the prices 
referendum—Hughes left Australia in late January 1916 for London. In the six months that he 
was overseas, the Easter uprising occurred in Dublin and the British authorities summarily 
executed leaders of the rebellion. Although the impact of the Irish-Catholic vote on the 
subsequent conscription vote continues to be debated, Hughes came to see the British failure 
to resolve Home Rule as a huge political liability in Australia, where Irish-Catholics formed 
almost a quarter of the population in Australia. In New Zealand, in contrast, most Irish were 
Protestants, the Irish-Catholic population was smaller and the debates were less affected by 
sectarianism.38  
 
Hughes’s long absence in London also gave the opponents of conscription time to mobilise. 
There were, in fact, many within the trade unions who were inclined to support conscription. 
However, in early 1916, an oligarchic executive council of the major trade union, the Australian 
Workers’ Union, forced pro-conscriptionists out of leadership positions.39 In early 1916, too, 
the critically important state labour organisations, such as the Sydney Trades and Labor 
Council, and the Melbourne Trades Hall Council, as well as the annual conferences of the state 
Labor parties in Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland, all voted to oppose conscription. 
They were soon to be joined by South Australia and Tasmania. Only the Western Australian 
party refused to commit itself. Then, at a special All Australia Trade Unionism and 
Conscription Congress in May 1916, an overwhelming majority declared its “uncompromising 
hostility” to conscription.40 
 
Finally, Hughes’s absence from the home front coincided with the launching of the Battle of 
the Somme on 1 July. This soon involved the first major commitment of Australians to the 
Western Front and within less than eight weeks the Australian Imperial Force had suffered 
some 28,500 casualties. Of course, these massive casualties supposedly justified the military 
case for conscription. But they also invested the popular debate about conscription with the 
toxic mix of mass grief and despair about a war that seemed beyond the control of any politician 
or military commander. In a classic case of misdirected aggression, these emotions were 
deflected onto opponents at home. Similarly, when Hughes again sought to win popular support 
for conscription in late 1917, the campaign was charged with emotional dynamite because it 
was held at the end of the Third Battle of Ypres or Passchendaele, a battle that even at the time 
was recognised to be the acme of futile attrition.  
 
What might have been the result if Hughes had held the referendum in the first half of 1916 
and not the second? What if he had stayed at home in early 1916 to push this critical issue 
through? Massey too had been invited as a Dominion leader to come to London for 
consultations, but he sailed for Britain only in mid-August 1916 after he had carefully 
shepherded the Military Service Act through parliament. Moreover, in what was a matter of 
luck rather than calculation, Massey was able to do this before the New Zealand Division was 
committed to the Battle of the Somme on 15 September 1916. Speculation about the impact of 
timing is of course counterfactual history. Alas, we will never know how many Australians 
who chose to vote No had lost a family member on the Western Front between July and October 
1916. Perhaps all we can conclude with confidence is that Hughes’s prolonged absence made 
it even more difficult for him to manage a debate that was rapidly spiralling out of control.  
 
 
10 
Journal of New Zealand Studies NS27 (2018), 2-15  
https://doi.org/10.26686/jnzs.v0iNS27.5173 
 
Leadership Styles 
A related issue that may have shaped the differing outcomes in Australia and New Zealand was 
the leadership provided by Hughes and Massey. No matter where the battle over conscription 
was fought out across the British Empire, it demanded that political leaders manifest high-level 
skills of negotiation and compromise. These were not qualities that Hughes possessed in 
abundance. In many ways, he was a formidable politician, bringing to the defence of Australian 
interests, as he saw them, an almost fanatical passion and energy. But as the anticonscriptionist 
campaign gathered strength, Hughes became increasingly confrontational, presumably because 
he saw his personal and political authority challenged. In particular, he resorted to using the 
powers of the War Precautions Act in a partisan manner, to restrict the freedom of speech, 
assembly and press of his political opponents. That said, with one notable exception—that is, 
the imprisonment of the leaders of the Industrial Workers of the World in late 1916 on trumped-
up charges of arson and treason—the use of state power against the left in Australia was not as 
draconian as in New Zealand. In November 1916, Boote was fined £16 with costs. But when 
the anticonscriptionist campaign got a new lease of life in New Zealand, in late 1916, “almost 
half the effective platform propagandists of the Labour Movement”—leaders such as Patrick 
Webb, Frederick Cooke, Robert Semple, Peter Fraser, John Thorn and Thomas Brindle—were 
imprisoned with sentences of up to a year, in some cases with hard labour.41 (This was despite 
the preference of the authorities, seeking “as wide a legitimation as possible,” to use the 
minimum of state compulsion and coercion to sustain the war effort.42) The treatment of 
religious, and particularly conscientious, objectors in New Zealand was also particularly harsh. 
As Peter O’Connor has argued, New Zealand was “less tolerant than the United Kingdom 
where legislation allowed for conscientious as well as religious objection,” and the criteria for 
exemption from military service in New Zealand were so restrictive, and in certain respects, 
arbitrary, that by the end of 1917 the great majority of objectors—possibly, 208—had been 
imprisoned.43 Meanwhile, in the most celebrated case, fourteen conscientious objectors were 
classed as “defiant objectors” and were sent overseas in July 1917, where some were subjected 
to brutal military punishments and incarceration.44 
 
Yet if there were limits to Hughes’s exercise of power, he projected an authoritarian style 
allowing his critics to cast him in the mould of the very Prussian militarism that Australia was 
purportedly fighting. In particular, Hughes suffered significant political damage when in the 
middle of the 1916 conscription campaign he used such powers as he did have under the 
Defence Act to call up eligible men for military training. Supposedly, this measure was meant 
to ensure that there would be a body of troops partially trained and ready to embark in the event 
of the referendum approving conscription. However, it seemed a preemptive and arrogant 
prejudging of the result of the referendum.  
 
In contrast, Massey had a somewhat deceptive “bluff rustic persona” but he was an astute 
politician.45 Not only did he manage to develop consensus within the national government that 
the Reform Party and Liberals formed in August 1915—a coalition that required that cabinet 
decisions be unanimous—but with the assistance of his effective Minister for Defence, James 
Allen, Massey presented to New Zealanders a system of military service that was politically 
tolerable. The Military Service Bill of 1916, which contained 47 clauses (as compared to 8 in 
the comparable British Bill), was shaped around the principle that volunteering would continue 
to be the preferred means of recruitment. Conscription would only be introduced if a particular 
military district did not meet its quota. In that instance, men from that district would be 
conscripted by a ballot to make up the shortfall. It was a masterly compromise which “read the 
public mood with adroitness.”46 As Paul Baker has put it, the scheme meant that “the 
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application of conscription would depend not upon a Government decision, but upon a shortage 
of volunteers—in effect, a popular decision.”47 In addition, men were conscripted by monthly 
ballot, not, as elsewhere, en masse by a preestablished category of eligibility. Appeals for 
exemption from service (be they on the grounds of employment or beliefs) were largely 
administered by independent bodies or government departments other than Defence. 
Importantly, too, Massey circumvented the delicate question of Māori loyalty by initially 
imposing conscription on Pākehā only.48 This changed in June 1917 but even then, Allen, who 
administered the scheme with considerable sensitivity, decided to apply it only to the Waikato–
Maniapoto land district, as other iwi supposedly met their obligations by volunteering earlier.49 
In the event, there was continuing resistance from the Waikato, who had a tradition of 
nonviolence after the 1860s wars and linked conscription to demands for the restitution of their 
lost lands. Ultimately, only 552 Māori men were called up.50 Yet, despite this Māori resistance, 
and that of a small number of conscientious objectors, the New Zealand scheme met what 
Margaret Levi has called “the minimal terms of the democratic conscription bargain,” in that 
the government conscripted “according to some legislated and relatively equitable formula” 
and thereby elicited “the contingent consent” of the majority of the New Zealand population.51 
 
The carefully crafted scheme of conscription in New Zealand was a dramatic contrast to what 
Hughes put to the Australian people. On 28 October 1916 Australians were asked: “Are you in 
favour of the Government having, in this grave emergency, the same compulsory powers over 
citizens in regard to requiring their military service, for the term of this war, outside the 
Commonwealth, as it has now with regard to military service within the Commonwealth?” It 
was an opaque question that required a level of trust in government that many Australians were 
unwilling to give. Hughes seems to have recognized this, and when he put the question of 
conscription to the votes again in December 1917 he proposed something akin to the New 
Zealand scheme. But it was too late. The 1917 campaign was probably unwinnable. Not only 
had there been nearly 77,000 further Australian casualties in more ultimately indecisive battles 
in 1917, but the No campaign was given additional force by Ryan and a new major player, the 
Catholic Archbishop of Melbourne, Daniel Mannix. Although his influence on the national 
vote has been overestimated, Mannix can perhaps take some of the credit for Victoria’s vote 
changing from Yes in 1916 to No in 1917. 
 
Hughes’s failure to offer a more politically palatable version of conscription to the Australian 
people might be attributable to his chaotic style of governance. His cabinet procedures verged 
on the dysfunctional and he struggled to delegate. But his Minister of Defence, George Pearce, 
was less able than Massey’s Allen and the demands of the Australian Imperial Force for 
reinforcements were far greater than those of the New Zealand Expeditionary Force. By early 
1916 Australia was committed to maintaining five—even, it was hoped for a while, six—
divisions in the field. The New Zealand government, in contrast, husbanded its manpower 
resources, limiting its commitments to one large division on the Western Front and a Mounted 
Rifles Brigade in Palestine.52 This arguably gave Massey the flexibility to introduce a less 
invasive form of conscription, with the result, historian Chris Pugsley has claimed, that “public 
opinion was not split asunder with the political turmoil and dissent that was the legacy of the 
ill-planned and insufficiently thought-through reinforcement procedures of Australia and 
Canada.”53  
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Conclusion 
In conclusion, it seems that any explanation of the victory of the anticonscription vote in 
Australia in 1916 and 1917 needs to incorporate structure, contingency and individual agency. 
Given that the vote for No in Australia in 1916 won by only a small margin of 72,476 votes, or 
3.2 percent of the valid votes cast, it would be unwise to dismiss the significance of timing and 
leadership styles.54 Given that the whole apparatus of the state and most of the media had been 
campaigning for Yes, Hughes had a chance of winning, at least in 1916. However, in some 
critical respects he misplayed his hand. Had he attached less importance to imperial matters 
and considered more closely in 1916 the carefully crafted and politically palatable scheme that 
his New Zealand counterpart was introducing across the Tasman, he might perhaps have 
persuaded enough Australians to consent to conscription.  
 
However, the unique and precocious strength of the labour movement within Australia 
ultimately played a decisive role. While Massey could rely on a solid parliamentary majority, 
Hughes had to put the matter of conscription to the vote with all the political risks that this 
entailed. At the same time the sheer scale of the extraparliamentary Australian labour 
movement provided the anticonscription movement with the organizational structure to 
mobilize mass opposition and, through the labour press, to give voice to powerful dissent.55 
The labour movement, of course, was not the only source of opposition to conscription: the 
anticonscriptionist movement was a broad church, including middle-class liberals, pacifists and 
those for whom it was morally offensive to force men to kill. But the individual voice could be 
easily silenced. The labour movement of Australia—divided, fractured and profoundly 
damaged though it was by the conscription debate—could not. As the president of Political 
Labor League in NSW said at a public meeting in Sydney Town Hall, “You will see here no 
Prime Ministers, no Premiers, and no Lord Mayors, but you will see the people’s 
representatives, who will tell you there is no need of conscription in Australia.”56 
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